Tuesday, October 30, 2007

What we missed

John Judis has about as straightforward an analysis of the Bush administration's imperial folly as you'll find. The entire article is really worth reading.

Sometimes the name calling and aspersions cast make terms like "imperialism" and "neo con" almost meaningless. It is vitally important, however, to understand the meaning of those terms in a historical sense. To ignore the history, is of course, the height of folly. Barbara Tuchman made that clear. Judis' article clearly delineates the differences between the liberal interventionism of Wilson, FDR, GHWBush and Clinton and the more radical and original imperialist approach that Bush has adopted, with a great deal of help from the neo-conservative cabal that surrounds him.

When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, however, his foreign policy echoed not only that of neo-isolationist Republicans like former Majority Leader Dick Armey, but also that of America's foreign policy before we decided in 1898 that we had to get involved in the struggle for empire. That was an America that not only scorned empire but was oblivious to much of the outside world. Bush disdained international organizations. He withdrew the United States from the Kyoto climate treaty and whatever other international agreements had yet to be ratified. He was a unilateralist, but he was reluctant to use America's singular power to affect the governments of other countries. His highest defense priority was the erection of an anti-missile system, the purpose of which was not only to make the United States impregnable from foreign attack, but also to reduce the reliance of the U.S. on other countries for its security......After September 11, they spoke openly of creating a new American empire. "People are now coming out of the closet on the word ‘empire,'" Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer exulted.


Indeed, this brand of imperialism, as practiced by the Bush administration, is remarkably similar to the older European variety. Its outward veneer is optimistic and even triumphalist, when articulated by a neo-conservative like Max Boot or William Kristol, and is usually accompanied by a vision of global moral-religious-social transformation. The British boasted of bringing Christianity and civilization to the heathens; America's neo-conservatives trumpet the virtues of free-market capitalism and democracy. And like the older imperialism, Bush's policy toward Iraq and the Middle East has been driven by a fear of losing out on scarce natural resources. Ultimately, his policy is as much a product of the relative decline of American power brought about by the increasingly fierce international competition for resources and markets as it is of America's "unipolar moment."


The Middle East, where Muslims still blanch at the Crusades and later British and French attempts to divide and rule, is particularly sensitive to outside attempts at domination. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda didn't spring from Mecca but from the battlefield in Afghanistan, from resentment of American support for Israel and of American bases on Arab soil. Bush's policy in the region has reflected a profound ignorance of this history. Wrote former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in January 2007, "America is acting like a colonial power in Iraq. But the age of colonialism is over. Waging a colonial war in the post-colonial age is self-defeating."


It is this "profound ignorance", this proud anti-intellectual and ahistorical posture that rankles me the most. At that end of the day, none of it should have been a surprise. He had laid it all out there on the campaign trail, and for some reason we ignored the danger. We elected a Yale cheerleader because we convinced ourselves he was a rugged cowboy. We elected a lifelong failure because we convinced ourselves that he radiated strength. We chose an alcoholic religious fanatic because he seemed like the kind of guy you could have a beer with. The fault, dear Brutus....

There were many pundits that were shouted down in the run up to the invasion of Iraq who warned that this outcome was likely. We failed to distinguish between what we achieved (and how we achieved it) in Bosnia from what we were undertaking in Baghdad. Shame on us for that.

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